Rule 184 - Revision history

en>Rjwilmsi: /* References */Journal cites, completed 1 page range using AWB (10495)

2014-11-18T09:17:39Z

References: Journal cites, completed 1 page range using AWB (10495)

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:17, 18 November 2014
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	~~{{Other uses\|Closure (disambiguation){{!}}Closure}}~~		I would like to introduce myself to you, I am Andrew and my wife doesn't like it at all. Ohio is where my home is but my husband desires us to move. Since I was 18 I've been operating as a bookkeeper but soon my wife and I will begin our personal company. To climb is something I truly enjoy doing.<br><br>My weblog; [http://fashionlinked.com/index.php?do=/profile-13453/info/ psychic phone readings]

	'''Epistemic closure'''<ref name="stanford">{{cite web \|author=Luper, Steven \|title=The Epistemic Closure Principle \|date=31 December 2001 \|work=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] \|publisher= \|url=http://plato.stanford.~~edu/entries/closure-epistemic/#CloPri}}</ref>~~ is ~~a [[property (philosophy)\|property]] of some [[belief system]]s. It~~ is the [[concept\|principle]] that if a subject <math>S</math> knows <math>p</math>, and <math>S</math> knows that <math>p</math> [[Logical consequence\|entails]] <math>q</math>, then <math>S</math> can thereby come to know that <math>q</math>. Most [[epistemology\|epistemological]] [[philosophical theory\|theories]] involve a closure principle and many [[Skepticism\|skeptical]] [[argument]]s assume a closure principle.

	On the other hand, some epistemologists, including [[Robert Nozick]], have denied closure principles on the basis of [[reliabilism\|reliabilist]] accounts of knowledge. Nozick, in ''[[Philosophical Explanations]]'', advocated that, when considering the [[Gettier problem]], the least counter-intuitive assumption we give up should be epistemic closure. ~~Nozick suggested a "truth tracking" theory of knowledge, in which the x~~ was ~~said to know P if x~~'~~s belief in P tracked the truth of P through the relevant [[modal logic\|modal scenarios]].<ref>''Philosophical explanations'', By Robert Nozick (Harvard 1981), page 204</ref>~~

	A subject may not actually believe <var>q</var>, for example, regardless of whether he or she is justified or warranted. Thus, one might instead say that knowledge is closed under ''known'' deduction: if, while knowing <var>p</var>, <var>S</var> believes <var>q</var> because <var>S</var> knows that <var>p</var> entails <var>q</var>, then <var>S</var> knows <var>q</var>.<ref name="stanford" /> An even stronger formulation would be as such: If, while knowing various propositions, <var>S</var> believes <var>p</var> because <var>S</var> knows that they entail <var>p</var>, then <var>S</var> knows <var>p</var>.<ref name="stanford" /> While the principle of epistemic closure is generally regarded as intuitive,<ref>{{cite journal \|author=Brady, Michael; Pritchard, Duncan \|title=Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects \|journal=[[The Philosophical Quarterly]] \|volume=55 \|issue=219 \|pages=161–171 \|year=2005 \|doi=10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x \|url=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x/abstract }}</ref> philosophers such as [[Robert Nozick]] and [[Fred Dretske]] have argued against it.

	~~== Justificatory closure ==~~
	In the seminal 1963 paper, “[[Gettier problem\|Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?]]”, Edmund Gettier gave an assumption (later called the “principle of deducibility for justification” by [[Irving Thalberg, Jr.]]<ref>{{cite journal \|author=Thalberg Jr., Irving \|title=In Defense of Justified True Belief \|journal=[[Journal of Philosophy]] \|volume=66 \|issue=22 \|pages=794–803 \|date=November 1969 \|jstor=2024370 \|ref={{harvid\|Thalberg\|1969}}}}</ref>) that would serve as a basis for the rest of his piece: “for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is ~~justified in believing Q~~.~~”<ref>{{cite journal \|author=Gettier, Edmund \|title=Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? \|journal=[[Analysis (journal)\|Analysis]] \|volume=23 \|issue=6 \|pages=121–3 \|date=June 1963 \|jstor=3326922}}~~<~~/ref~~> This was seized upon by Thalberg, who rejected the principle in order to demonstrate that one of Gettier's examples fails to support Gettier's main thesis that justified true belief is not knowledge (in the following quotation, (1) refers to “Jones will get the job”, (2) refers to “Jones has ten coins”, and (3) is the [[logical conjunction]] of (1) and (2)):

	<~~blockquote~~>~~Why doesn't Gettier's principle (PDJ) hold in the evidential situation he has described? You multiply your risks of being wrong when you believe a conjunction. […&nbsp~~;T]he most elementary theory of probability indicates that Smith's prospects of being right on both (1) and (2), namely, of being right on (3), are bound to be less favorable than his prospects of being right on either (1) or (2). In fact, Smith's chances of being right on (3) might not come up to the minimum standard of justification which (1) and (2) barely satisfy, and Smith would be unjustified in accepting (3). {{harv\|Thalberg\|1969\|p=798}}</blockquote>

	~~== Epistemic closure in US political discussion ==~~
	The term "epistemic closure" has been used in US political debate to refer to the claim that the belief systems of political conservatives are closed systems of deduction, which cannot be affected by [[~~empirical evidence]].<ref name=nyt>{{cite news \|title=‘Epistemic Closure’? Those are Fighting Words \|author=Patricia Cohen \|url=~~http://~~www.nytimes~~.com/~~2010/04/28/books/28conserv~~.~~html~~?_r=0 \|newspaper=[[The New York Times]] \|date=27 April 2010 \|accessdate=28 November 2012}}</ref> This use of the term was popularized by libertarian blogger and commentator [[Julian Sanchez (writer)\|Julian Sanchez]] in 2010<ref name=~~"nyt"~~ /~~><ref>{{cite web \|author=Sanchez, Julian \|title=Frum, Cocktail Parties, and the Threat of Doubt \|date=26 March 2010 \|url=http://www.juliansanchez.com/2010/03/26/frum-cocktail-parties-and-the-threat-of~~-~~doubt}}<~~/~~ref> as an extreme form of [[confirmation bias]].~~

	~~== See also ==~~
	* [[False-consensus effect]]
	* [[Confirmation bias]]
	* [[Closure: A Short History of Everything]] by Hilary Lawson, Routledge 2001

	~~== References ==~~
	~~{{reflist}}~~

	~~==External links==~~
	* {{SEP\|closure-epistemic\|The Epistemic Closure Principle}}
	* {{InPho\|idea\|1133}}
	* {{IEP\|epis-clo/}}
	* {{PhilPapers\|search\|Epistemic_closure}}

	~~{{skepticism}}~~

	~~[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]~~
	~~[[Category:Belief]]~~
	~~[[Category:Modal logic]]~~
	~~[[Category:Philosophy of Robert Nozick]~~]

en>David Eppstein: corresponding => associating

2013-12-16T19:05:50Z

corresponding => associating

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:05, 16 December 2013
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	The ~~title~~ of the ~~writer is Jayson~~. ~~Some time~~ in the ~~past she chose~~ to ~~live~~ in ~~Alaska~~ and ~~her mothers~~ and ~~fathers live close~~ by. ~~Office supervising~~ is ~~what she does for~~ a ~~residing~~. ~~What me~~ and ~~my family members adore~~ is ~~performing ballet but I~~'~~ve been using~~ on ~~new issues recently~~.<br><br>~~my web-site :: online psychics; [~~http://~~clothingcarearchworth~~.com/~~index~~.~~php~~?~~document_srl~~=~~441551&mid~~=~~customer_review clothingcarearchworth~~.com],		{{Other uses\|Closure (disambiguation){{!}}Closure}}

			'''Epistemic closure'''<ref name="stanford">{{cite web \|author=Luper, Steven \|title=The Epistemic Closure Principle \|date=31 December 2001 \|work=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] \|publisher= \|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/closure-epistemic/#CloPri}}</ref> is a [[property (philosophy)\|property]] of some [[belief system]]s. It is the [[concept\|principle]] that if a subject <math>S</math> knows <math>p</math>, and <math>S</math> knows that <math>p</math> [[Logical consequence\|entails]] <math>q</math>, then <math>S</math> can thereby come to know that <math>q</math>. Most [[epistemology\|epistemological]] [[philosophical theory\|theories]] involve a closure principle and many [[Skepticism\|skeptical]] [[argument]]s assume a closure principle.

			On the other hand, some epistemologists, including [[Robert Nozick]], have denied closure principles on the basis of [[reliabilism\|reliabilist]] accounts of knowledge. Nozick, in ''[[Philosophical Explanations]]'', advocated that, when considering the [[Gettier problem]], the least counter-intuitive assumption we give up should be epistemic closure. Nozick suggested a "truth tracking" theory of knowledge, in which the x was said to know P if x's belief in P tracked the truth of P through the relevant [[modal logic\|modal scenarios]].<ref>''Philosophical explanations'', By Robert Nozick (Harvard 1981), page 204</ref>

			A subject may not actually believe <var>q</var>, for example, regardless of whether he or she is justified or warranted. Thus, one might instead say that knowledge is closed under ''known'' deduction: if, while knowing <var>p</var>, <var>S</var> believes <var>q</var> because <var>S</var> knows that <var>p</var> entails <var>q</var>, then <var>S</var> knows <var>q</var>.<ref name="stanford" /> An even stronger formulation would be as such: If, while knowing various propositions, <var>S</var> believes <var>p</var> because <var>S</var> knows that they entail <var>p</var>, then <var>S</var> knows <var>p</var>.<ref name="stanford" /> While the principle of epistemic closure is generally regarded as intuitive,<ref>{{cite journal \|author=Brady, Michael; Pritchard, Duncan \|title=Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects \|journal=[[The Philosophical Quarterly]] \|volume=55 \|issue=219 \|pages=161–171 \|year=2005 \|doi=10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x \|url=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x/abstract }}</ref> philosophers such as [[Robert Nozick]] and [[Fred Dretske]] have argued against it.

			== Justificatory closure ==
			In the seminal 1963 paper, “[[Gettier problem\|Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?]]”, Edmund Gettier gave an assumption (later called the “principle of deducibility for justification” by [[Irving Thalberg, Jr.]]<ref>{{cite journal \|author=Thalberg Jr., Irving \|title=In Defense of Justified True Belief \|journal=[[Journal of Philosophy]] \|volume=66 \|issue=22 \|pages=794–803 \|date=November 1969 \|jstor=2024370 \|ref={{harvid\|Thalberg\|1969}}}}</ref>) that would serve as a basis for the rest of his piece: “for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.”<ref>{{cite journal \|author=Gettier, Edmund \|title=Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? \|journal=[[Analysis (journal)\|Analysis]] \|volume=23 \|issue=6 \|pages=121–3 \|date=June 1963 \|jstor=3326922}}</ref> This was seized upon by Thalberg, who rejected the principle in order to demonstrate that one of Gettier's examples fails to support Gettier's main thesis that justified true belief is not knowledge (in the following quotation, (1) refers to “Jones will get the job”, (2) refers to “Jones has ten coins”, and (3) is the [[logical conjunction]] of (1) and (2)):

			<blockquote>Why doesn't Gettier's principle (PDJ) hold in the evidential situation he has described? You multiply your risks of being wrong when you believe a conjunction. [… T]he most elementary theory of probability indicates that Smith's prospects of being right on both (1) and (2), namely, of being right on (3), are bound to be less favorable than his prospects of being right on either (1) or (2). In fact, Smith's chances of being right on (3) might not come up to the minimum standard of justification which (1) and (2) barely satisfy, and Smith would be unjustified in accepting (3). {{harv\|Thalberg\|1969\|p=798}}</blockquote>

			== Epistemic closure in US political discussion ==
			The term "epistemic closure" has been used in US political debate to refer to the claim that the belief systems of political conservatives are closed systems of deduction, which cannot be affected by [[empirical evidence]].<ref name=nyt>{{cite news \|title=‘Epistemic Closure’? Those are Fighting Words \|author=Patricia Cohen \|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/books/28conserv.html?_r=0 \|newspaper=[[The New York Times]] \|date=27 April 2010 \|accessdate=28 November 2012}}</ref> This use of the term was popularized by libertarian blogger and commentator [[Julian Sanchez (writer)\|Julian Sanchez]] in 2010<ref name="nyt" /><ref>{{cite web \|author=Sanchez, Julian \|title=Frum, Cocktail Parties, and the Threat of Doubt \|date=26 March 2010 \|url=http://www.juliansanchez.com/2010/03/26/frum-cocktail-parties-and-the-threat-of-doubt}}</ref> as an extreme form of [[confirmation bias]].

			== See also ==
			* [[False-consensus effect]]
			* [[Confirmation bias]]
			* [[Closure: A Short History of Everything]] by Hilary Lawson, Routledge 2001

			== References ==
			{{reflist}}

			==External links==
			* {{SEP\|closure-epistemic\|The Epistemic Closure Principle}}
			* {{InPho\|idea\|1133}}
			* {{IEP\|epis-clo/}}
			* {{PhilPapers\|search\|Epistemic_closure}}

			{{skepticism}}

			[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
			[[Category:Belief]]
			[[Category:Modal logic]]
			[[Category:Philosophy of Robert Nozick]]

en>Helpful Pixie Bot: ISBNs (Build KE)

2012-05-08T02:37:24Z

ISBNs (Build KE)

New page

The title of the writer is Jayson. Some time in the past she chose to live in Alaska and her mothers and fathers live close by. Office supervising is what she does for a residing. What me and my family members adore is performing ballet but I've been using on new issues recently.<br><br>my web-site :: online psychics; [http://clothingcarearchworth.com/index.php?document_srl=441551&mid=customer_review clothingcarearchworth.com],