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It | '''Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld protocol''', also known as a '''commutator key exchange''', is a key-exchange protocol using [[nonabelian group]]s. It was invented by Drs. Michael Anshel, Iris Anshel, and [[Dorian M. Goldfeld|Dorian Goldfeld]]. | ||
Unlike other group-based protocols it does not employ any commuting or commutative | |||
subgroups of a given platform group and can, in fact, use any nonabelian group with | |||
efficiently computable normal forms. | |||
== Description == | |||
Let ''G'' be a fixed nonabelian [[Group (mathematics)|group]] called a ''platform group''. | |||
'''Alice's public/private information:''' | |||
* ''Alice's public key'' is a tuple of elements <math>{\overline{a}}=(a_1,\ldots,a_n)</math> in ''G''. | |||
* ''Alice's private key'' is a sequence of elements from <math>{\overline{a}}</math> and their inverses: <math>a_{i_1}^{\varepsilon_1}, \ldots, a_{i_L}^{\varepsilon_L}</math>, where <math>a_{i_k}\in{\overline{a}}</math> and <math>\varepsilon_k=\pm 1</math>. Based on that sequence she computes the product <math>A = a_{i_1}^{\varepsilon_1} \ldots a_{i_L}^{\varepsilon_L}</math>. | |||
'''Bob's public/private information:''' | |||
* ''Bob's public key'' is a tuple of elements <math>{\overline{b}}=(b_1,\ldots,b_n)</math> in <math>G</math>. | |||
* ''Bob's private key'' is a sequence of elements from <math>{\overline{b}}</math> and their inverses: <math>b_{j_1}^{\delta_1}, \ldots, b_{j_L}^{\delta_L}</math>, where <math>b_{j_k}\in{\overline{b}}</math> and <math>\delta_k=\pm 1</math>. Based on that sequence she computes the product <math>B = b_{j_1}^{\delta_1} \ldots b_{j_L}^{\delta_L}</math>. | |||
'''Transitions:''' | |||
* Alice sends a tuple <math>{\overline{b}}=(A^{-1}b_1A,\ldots,A^{-1}b_nA)</math> to Bob. | |||
* Bob sends a tuple <math>{\overline{b}}=(B^{-1}a_1B,\ldots,B^{-1}a_nB)</math> to Alice. | |||
'''Shared key:''' | |||
The key shared by Alice and Bob is the group element <math>K = A^{-1} B^{-1} A B \in G</math> called the [[commutator]] of <math>A</math> and <math>B</math>. | |||
* Alice computes <math>K</math> as a product <math>A^{-1} \cdot B^{-1}a_{i_1}^{\varepsilon_1}B\cdots B^{-1}a_{i_L}^{\varepsilon_L}B</math>. | |||
* Bob computes <math>K</math> as a product <math>(A^{-1}b_{i_1}^{\varepsilon_1}A \cdots A^{-1} b_{i_L}^{\varepsilon_L}A)^{-1} \cdot B = A^{-1} B^{-1} A B</math>. | |||
==See also== | |||
* [[Group-based cryptography]] | |||
== References == | |||
* I. Anshel, M. Anshel, and D. Goldfeld, ''[http://www-cs.engr.ccny.cuny.edu/~csmma/MRLpap.pdf An algebraic method for public-key cryptography]'', Math. Res. Lett. 6 (1999), pp. 287–291. | |||
{{DEFAULTSORT:Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange}} | |||
[[Category:Cryptographic protocols]] |
Revision as of 23:58, 14 January 2014
Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld protocol, also known as a commutator key exchange, is a key-exchange protocol using nonabelian groups. It was invented by Drs. Michael Anshel, Iris Anshel, and Dorian Goldfeld. Unlike other group-based protocols it does not employ any commuting or commutative subgroups of a given platform group and can, in fact, use any nonabelian group with efficiently computable normal forms.
Description
Let G be a fixed nonabelian group called a platform group.
Alice's public/private information:
- Alice's public key is a tuple of elements in G.
- Alice's private key is a sequence of elements from and their inverses: , where and . Based on that sequence she computes the product .
Bob's public/private information:
- Bob's public key is a tuple of elements in .
- Bob's private key is a sequence of elements from and their inverses: , where and . Based on that sequence she computes the product .
Transitions:
Shared key:
The key shared by Alice and Bob is the group element called the commutator of and .
See also
References
- I. Anshel, M. Anshel, and D. Goldfeld, An algebraic method for public-key cryptography, Math. Res. Lett. 6 (1999), pp. 287–291.